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Loku vaku lanja, lanja ka wena - lanja 
Maputukezi f male mi baku leyi - lanja 
Maputukezi i male mi ntxontxaku leyi - lanja 
Maputukezi i male mi ntxontxaku leyi - lanja 
When they say heave that shovel, shovel - heave 
When they say heave that shovel, shovel - heave 
When they say heave that shovel, shovel - heave 
The Portuguese live by stealing our wages - heave 
The Portuguese live by stealing our wages - heave 
The Portuguese live by stealing our wages - heave 
-- worksong to accompany coal loading at the port version ofFelizberto Zavala, recorded 13 July 1977, Maputo, Mozambique 
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ATTITUDES TOWARD RACE AND WORK IN MOZAMBIQUE: 
LOUREN~O MARQUES, 1900-1974 
by Jeanne Penvenne 
An important current of English language scholarship on the 
Portuguese colonial experience in Africa, from the basic works of 
Boxer, Duffy and Harris to the more recent contributions of Gerald 
Bender, Leroy Vail and Landeg White, has highlighted the bankruptcy 
of idealized Portuguese racial toleration, asserting that the facts 
1 
simply do not corroborate the propaganda. Vail and White intro-
duce their historical study of a Mozambican work song with the 
startling juxtaposition of two recollections of the same man, 
Jose de Paiva Raposo; one by a fellow Portuguese in Mozambique, 
the other by African villagers in Luabo and Mopeia Mozambique who 
remembered working under Paiva Raposo. The first viewed him as 
"a just and generous [man]" with a "special knack of dealing with 
the Africans who adored him ... ," and the second as "an ordinary 
stupid man •••• We got his money for him and we got paid so little. 
2 
•.. Paiva (Raposo) was the one who made the people suffer •... " 
These divergent views illustrate the contradictions in a system 
which exacerbated and progressively institutionalized inequality 
in terms of a smothering racist paternalism, thus compounding 
social conflict derived from class, age and sex differences. This paper 
seeksto shed some light on African attitudes toward the Portuguese 
in Mozambique, and vice versa, through empirical data from southern 
Mozambique, specifically Louren~o Marques, the major locus of 
2 
3 
);'q;r;tugue.,e · ;r;e:._;i,dence i,n ·Mozambi,que :i,n. the twenti,eth centu,y. 
One can no more discuss·the typical Po,:tuguesethan the typ-
ical African, since to do so is to ignore crucial diversity within 
each group. Portuguese lived and worked in a variety of situations 
which, for the most part, determined the nature of their contact 
with various Mozambicans. Conversely, Mozambicans came into contact 
with Portuguese in different contexts. One has to be aware of the 
cultural context within which each party functioned prior to mutual 
contact, as well as the particular nature of colonial inter-racial 
contacts with respect to changing relations of production. 
The ideology of policy, and cultural paradigms tempered by the 
reality of practice shaped the attitudes of Portuguese toward Africans 
while African cultural paradigms similarly tempered by experience 
informed African attitudes toward the Portuguese. Theories and in-
tellectual roots of Portuguese colonial policy have been explored in 
4 
great depth elsewhere. General works on colonial Africa, including the 
Portuguese, French, German, Belgian and British colonies, contrast 
metropolitan theory and ideology with local practice and suggest the 
diverse implications of each for various interest groups in Africa, 
5 
black and white. In general, colonial theory set forth the axiom of 
some form of projected interraciail. partnership, but it seems fair in 
light of the twentieth century African colonial experience to concur 
with Patrick O1Meara, writing about partnership in a Rhodesian con~ 
text: 
The key word in• •the political vocabula,ry , • , wa.s 
"partnership'' •• , This term was "a very .. blessed 
word" and is said to have described.,,"Pa;r;tner-
ship of the bla.ck horse and the white rider." 
For the .•• government it implied ultimate 
equ'llity. for· ,A,fr;i;can,., · For· most:· Afric;3_ns 
iLme8snt ct st:i:11 uncertctin future,6 
3 
The partnership was interpreted.by J,M, da Silva Cunha to mean that 
the colonial power was to see to the provision of capital and technology 
7 
while the African provided the manpower, 
Historians of Mozambique have only recently begun to focus on 
African attitudes toward the Portuguese, as part of their historical 
experience during the colonial period, Many historians have only re-
cently been afforded the opportunity to ask Mozambicans how they remem-
ber their past, The path of inquiry has proven fruitful, and has 
highlighted the need for more careful research into African cultural 
attitudes, Vail and White, for example, suggest that attitudes toward 
Portuguese authority found expression in work songs, dance and drama 
performances, partly because that medium was the culturally accepted 
legitimate vehicle for the expression of such sentiments, Expressions 
of hostility, criticism, intimacy and other emotional sentiments which 
could lead to social tension if not controlled found their outlet in a 
ritual form which served to convey the intended message, but in a 
8 
context which diminished the danger of heightened social tensions. 
Western historians have been more familiar with the medium of ex-
pression used by the small, but in western terms more articulate, group 
of Afro-European and western-educated African critics of Portuguese 
9 
colonialism who chose poetry and the press for their vehicle, For 
the majority of Mozambicans, however, ritualized oral expression was 
most familiar, 
In order to grasp·thenature of the Afro-Portuguese dialectic it 
is necessary to trace the changing forms of their socio-economic 
4 
;:Lnt<>ract;:LQn, /\frq-.Eurqpean ·contact· in soui:he'.l;'n .Mozi'!,mb;:L'lue up unt;:Ll the 
10 
la,st quartet• of· the nineteenth century was rooted in active trade, 
Ivory, horn, sk;:Lns and oilseeds were exchanged for cloth, beads, hoes, 
firearms and alcohol, Ivory was the key co11111lodity until the 187O1 s 
when· the ivory frontier moved beyond the LourenfO Marques and Inhambane 
hinterland. Slaves had been exported from Inhambane, at least until 
mid-century, but they were never comparable in numbers to the trade in 
northern Mozambique. The Rjonga clans of the Louren 7o Marques area 
had been able to maintain their independence in trade contacts with 
Europeans since the sixteenth century through negotiated alliances as 
11 
it suited their needs and their stre,ngths at the time. Diocleciano 
Fernandes das Neves provided a very detailed description of an ivory 
trading expedition from Louren~o Marques in the 186O1 s. The entire 
undertaking proceeded in the context of indigenous ritual -- or business 
practices as it were -- from the selection and hiring of porters, hun-
ters and guides to the provisioning, packing and departure of the ex-
pedition, to the marketing of goods, negotiation of safe passage and 
12 
river crossings. Any European taking a hostile attitude toward the 
African modus operandi would simply be unable to do business. 
During the nineteenth century, however, the volume of trade in-
creased substantially, supported in part by the rapid expansion of 
13 
British Indian credit, Portuguese efforts to secure their tenuous 
political hold on southern Mozambique redoubled with ·the increased 
trade volumes. This consolidation occasioned a number of local revolts, 
each of which led to the deportation of local Rjonga rulers, and their 
14 
replacement with Rjonga more sympathetic to the Portuguese presence. 
5 
froJU'the 1870 1s African hostility grew' in relation.to the increased 
European interference in their affairs,· The demand for African labor 
to build the Lourenro Marques port and rail facilities, and to service 
expanding European military and capital investment in the area coin-
cided with a period of deteriorating terms of trade for African products 
15 
and of Afro-European warfare in neighboring areas, 
Anticipation accelerated and toleration wore thin on both sides, 
culminating in the Portuguese political subjugation of the area in a 
series of costly military campaigns from 1894 to 1897. The complex 
interaction of African and European powers, Portugal's motivations for 
undertaking this expensive penetration of Mozambique, and African stra-
tegies in the face of the military threat have been explored and var-
16 
iously interpreted elsewhere. What is of concern here is how this 
penetration and the resultant politico-bureaucratic expansion to se-
cure the subjugation affected Afro-European relations which had formerly 
been largely restricted to trade contacts and negotiations conducted 
in the indigenous idiom. The redefinition of relations for the twen-
.,t:ceth century made it clear that the informal control of Mozambicans 
and their resources through the expansion of mercantile capital would 
no longer be sufficient in the face of rapid expansion of productive 
capitalism in the neighboring British areas. That expansion had its 
immediate roots in the diamond, sugar and gold production of the 1860 1s 
and 1870 1 s, but had undergone a qualitative transformation with the 
17 
discovery of the unprecedented gold potential of the Witwatersrand, 
Even before the Portuguese political consolidation of their 
Mozambican holdings, the weight of British capital loomed heavily in 
the area, The British through their contacts in India controlled 
6 
"the 1:1.on I s sfup;e'' of· trade froll) Louren<,o Marques as early as the 
18 
lllid-eighteenth century, Furthe=ore, lacking national risk cap-
ital for investment in their African colonies, particularly for 
Mozall)bique, the Portuguese had increasingly undertaken what little 
local construction there was in Louren~o Ji!arques through foreign 
concessions. By the twentieth century, most of these concessions 
19 
had found their way into British or British Indian hands. This 
situation of econolllic dependency was not at all lost on the African 
population which clearly perceived the weakness of the Portuguese 
in the face of powerful British capital. 
This African awareness was often discussed by the Portuguese 
as the political problem of "denationalization" of their people 
by the British. In March 1889, for example, the local press fueled 
its campaign to have the Portuguese government take over construc-
tion of the railway line from Louren<,o Marques to the Transvaal on 
the basis of threatened denationalization of the local population. 
The argument, which was obviously a weak cover for economic motiva-
tions, ran that since Africans were hired, trained and paid by the 
British with British currency, the Africans considered the railway 
to be British not Portuguese. Africans were thought to believe that 
the Portuguese had neither the brains nor the capital to undertake 
20 
the railway on the:l.r own. The argument, though irrelevant to the 
real issues at hand concerning the railway, d:l.d have soll)e strength 
:l.n fact. Mozall)bican informants with as fflany as 52 years of service 
at the Louren~o Ji!a:rques port consistently pointed out that the port 
and rail facilities, the town's most important businesses and indus-
tries were largely initiated with British capital and technology, 
7 
only to fie ta,ken over;a,t a later date by the·Portugue,;;e, ThePori:uguese 
were seen, ;a,nd accurately so,·as the bureaucrats, the overseers, the 
.. 21 
petty traders and the petty bourgeosie, 
Portug;a,1 1 s closest African allies, to say nothing of her own 
colonists, were disillusioned by their lack of prosperity at the turn 
of the century, particularly in contrast with the wealth of their 
English-Bpeaking neighbors. In 1890 the Rjonga regulo of the Mpfumo 
clan of Chilunguine, one of the more important and more sympathetic 
Rjonga chiefs in the area, wrote in desperation to the King of Portugal 
asking what he was to tell his people when they complained of condi-
tions in Louren.'so Marques, 
When my ancestors in 1544 conceded to 
Lourenco Marques and Ant&nio Caldeira, Your 
• Excellency's vassals, permission to establish 
a trading post on the Rio Fume, now called 
Espirito Santo [one of the major rivers 
forming the bay at Louren~o Marques]; it 
was because we thought relations with white 
men would bring prosperity and wealth to 
our land and happiness and abundance to our 
people. Despite all that, some 69 lustroes 
[345 years] have passed and in truth I say 
to Your Excellency that the country remains 
poor and unchanged and your tributaries 
and my subjects remain unhappy and hardly 
prosperous. 22 
It is evident from virtually all sources that the majority of 
Portuguese colonists in the 19th century were no less disillusioned 
than the above regulo. The early colonization scheme of the Companhia 
23 
de Louren~Q Marques in 1825 had ended in diaster. Diocleciano 
Fernandes das Neves in the 1860's was disgusted by the situation 
in Louren~o '.Marques where degi:edado soldiers lived by smuggling and 
24 
bribery -- plundering the local community rather th;a,n protecting it. 
The situation as described by Governor Castilho in the 1880 1s was 
8 
no better, Jl,esi,dents, · accord;i.ng to Castilho, wei:'e largely civil 
servants and sold:Lers cons·cripted from· among Portugal's most unforturnate 
citizenry, Castilho remarked that there were virtually no volunteers 
and that in the African context, former soldier, degredado,and former 
25 
degredado all amounted to the same thing. Again in the 1890's 
Governor Noronha described the Louren 5o Marques colonists as deported 
soldiers, degredados and "a certain number of functionaries sufficiently 
26 
unfit to not find placement in the metropole." The various colon-
ization schemes from the 1880's on met with little more success. 
Noronha and later Freire de Andrade noted that virtually all those 
sent from Lisbon eventually returned to the Metropole, either at 
state expense or from their own meager savings, poorer and less healthy 
27 
than when they originally left. 
A similar story was in fact echoed throughout the twentieth cen-
tury. Limpopo valley settlement schemes appeared at different times 
in a variety of stages with various degrees of investment, from the 
dreams of Neves in the 1860's onward. Portuguese fami.lies were set-
tled in the Limpopo valley in the late 1920's to work on sugar 
schemes, but many failed in the depression years. Many aspects of these 
settlements engendered African resentment and hostility, from the 
land alienation, forced labor supplies and use of African tax money 
to subsidize the schemes,to the fact of African exclusion as landowners 
or employers within the schemes, The African press complained bit-
terly of sums spent on extravagant and illconceived projects to bene-
fit Portuguese "wetbacks" while projects which could benefit the 
majority African population went begging supposedly for.lack of 
28 
funds. It is appropriate to note in this context the cynical view 
9 
of ag;i;;lcultural settlell)ent schemes held by many Afr:lc(lns, The news-. 
paper O Afticano, · the Lourenc;;o :Marques paper put oui: by Africans and 
Afro-Portuguese, put it nicely in 1918 when it acidly observed that 
the only successful white colonies to be established with vast govern-
ment support to date were Polana Beach and Pra~a 7 de Mar~o two 
popular gathering places where urban Portuguese bureaucrats enjoyed 
29 
their leisure hours. 
The post-World War II immigration boom again brought largely 
unskilled immigrants who found themselves unemployed, and whose pre-
sence strained labor relations, social welfare, and charitable support 
30 
systems to an extent which recalled the depression years in the city. 
Even the grandiose schemes of the late 1950 1 s and early 1960's which 
received unprecedented government financial and technical support 
were unable to introduce the projected number of settlers into pro-
ductive agriculture. Of the 9,500 settler families to be introduced 
as part of the project,only some 3,000 persons actually reached the 
Limpopo, and by 1961, many of those remaining were there for lack 
31 
of a viable alternative. 
One of the most poignant descriptions of the marginal settler 
was written by Jo'ao Albapivi, Afro-Portuguese journalist, grandson of 
a 19th century Ibrtugueseivory trader and one of his African wives. 
Like the above-mentioned Mpfumo regulo, Albasini was persuaded that 
under the guidance of so-called Portuguese civilizing missions, a 
prosperous and "civilized" Africa· could emerge, As Albasini matured 
into a sophisticated journalist, his bitter disillusionment found 
expression in the press, While watching the Pori:uguese ship Lusitania 
10 
sail from the Louren~o Marques harbor, carrying her usual load of 
returning migrants to the metropole, he was struck by the harsh contrast 
between the lofty theory of Portuguese civilizing missions and the 
grim reality lived by Portuguese colonists in Louren~o Mar~ues: 
The common Portuguese, who is knownas mumadji 
[common Portuguese immigrant] among the African 
population, always leaves Portugal with the 
fixed intention of a short stay in the land 
of the blacks to gather enough savings; and 
then to escape it all to retum to Portugal, 
settle in and enjoy the wealth which he man-
aged to accumulate, with God knows what sac-
rifices over 2, 3, or 4 years. 
Are they aware there (in Portugal), 
of the deprivations that these men suffer 
in order to save that 300 or 400$000 reis? 
It is a poem of pain and misery. A veritable 
madness that some of them live through in 
an effort to fill their suitcases -- with 
those paltry pieces of metal. Gold Fever! 
They live in pigsties, without light, 
without air, some 4 or 5 together in order 
to cut costs. They customarily eat three 
persons from the same meal, because it costs 
less. In a squalid diner, soups or stews, 
which are more accurately puddles of warm 
water in which some five beans swim hope-
lessly in search of company ••• These beans, 
whose horny consistency breaks the teeth of 
unsuspecting countrymen, force the stomach 
which ingests them to turn somersaults and 
to cry without hope. 
There they know nothing of what a driven 
spirit is capable of doing in the mania to 
make some money!32 
The mumaji as described by Albasini, the kubvana which roughly 
translates as rural poor white trash described in the African press 
and by oral informants,are eloquent testimony to the fact that the 
reality of the Portuguese input in Mozambique went beyond Silva 
Cunha's idealized ingredients of capital and technology. Portugal's 
contribution in these latter areas in fact was uneven at best, at 
11 
least until the late 19SO's. Ant6nio Enes whose Commission Report 
set the pace for Portuguese colonial goals in the twentieth century, 
clearly recognized that the Portuguese could not rely on the mumaji 
and the kubvana if they seriously wished to realize their ambitions 
in Mozambique: 
Our tropical Africa will not grow without 
the African. The capital needed to exploit 
it as it so needs to be exploited lies in the 
procurement of labor for exploitation: 
abundant, cheap and solid labor ••• arid this 
labor, given the circumstances, will never be 
supplied by European innnigrants •••• 33 
The labor relations and legislation which evolved during the 
twentieth century followed Enes' lead and tended to reinforce a 
structural inequality between black and white as laborers or entre-
preneurs, and a structural mutuality of Portuguese white interests --
labor, capital and the state in cooperation. The two chronic labor 
problems to be faced were first to get Mozambicans to work at the 
wages and in the conditions offered within Mozambique, and second 
toincorporate the largely unskilled, uncapitalized Portuguese innni-
grant population while maintaining working class discipline. 
Testimony from the Junta Consultiva do Governo in Louren~o Marques 
from Aptil 1891 is quoted at length below since it illustrates the 
extent :to which white'labor and capital were aware, very early 
on, of the particular situation of early capitalist penetration in 
a colonial context with respect to capital's need to control black 
labor through extra-economic means, and the extent to which the 
interests of the entire white community -- given the above premise 
were understood to coincide: 
12 
The European worker works in order to eat, 
and in nearly all countries there are more 
hands available than local industry requires, 
thus develops the enslavement of labor 
by capital -- of the proletariat by the 
bourgeoisie. In Louren~o Marques, as soon 
as the native has [.earned.] enough to 
marry one or more women, he then has his 
sustenance guaranteed by the labor of his 
wives and the product of his own labor 
then goes to buy more women, several 
head of cattle or to get drunk on alcohol. 
The result is that if in Europe the worker 
is in reality more dependant upon .the cap-
italist than vice versa, .. ·'.·' . in Lo·ur.e.r&'~ ..H?rques, 
the Europeans •.. are· dependent upon black 
(laborers) who in their turn barely depend, 
or do not at.all depend,upon whites. 
Therefore, if in Europe,as a result 
of the constant abuse of labor by the cap-
italist, the state finds it necessary to 
protect the worker, in Louren'so Marques •.•• 
it is incumbent upon the government to 
defend the interests of the European colony 
which more and more becomes identified 
with the interests of the state. Not only 
is this dependency felt by the employer 
with casual day laborers under the guidance 
of salaried [white] workers, but the same sit-
uation, or yet worse, attains with servants. 
No binding contract with blacks is possible 
under the actual laws now in effect.34 (Emphasis added) 
In order to protect the interests of the entire European community, 
including the white laborer whose function it was to oversee the manual 
labor of blacks, the extra-economic coercion of black labor was 
couched in racialist terms and attitudes. A society which justified 
the political exclusion of blacks on the basis of assumed inferiority 
and ill-conceived notions of civilization could logically follow with 
the unequal compensation of black labor and could obviously never 
seriously entertain the notion of social equality. Whether artic-
ulated in terms of noblesse oblige, beneficent paternalism, or the 
most crude racism, the assumption that black was ultimately to serve 
13 
white, that black was of secondary consideration to white, and that 
white knew best were axiomic. Despite the fact that many whites 
lived in situations comparable to their black neighbors, or worse, 
black workers would remain separated from, secondary to, and inade-
quately compensated in relation to white labor on the propaganda 
basis of cultural inferiority. When this situation did not emerge 
from socio-economic or legal structures, it was accomplished through 
informal accommodation. The principle of white privilege had to 
be maintained at all costs, since if it were allowed to erode, the 
very weight of its injustice would destroy it, and with it the dis-
proportionate benefits which accrued to the white population. 
The twentieth-century basis for Afro-European interaction which 
tempered mutual perceptions and attitudes, therefore, came to be 
structured in racially defined socio-economic terms. It was the 
understood privilege of a white person that the black person labor 
for him -- from that basis wages and conditions were negotiated. 
It was the privilege of the white Portuguese artisan to control 
a certain quota of contracts on state projects and eventually on 
all construction work undertaken in the colony. Many positions and 
opportunities were reserved for white Portuguese by law and many 
others were de:"facto reserved for them through influential patronage 
35 
networks. Given the pervasive atmosphere of white privilege, 
it is hardly surprising that white males attempted to extend this 
privilege to include sexual access to African women, particularly 
in rural areas where young adult males were often absent. Experience 
had taught African men and women that justice for this kind of 
14 
outrage was seldom to be had from the police or Native Affairs 
Department. One informant summed up the comments of many of his 
comrades when he said that the phrase which had to be first on one's 
mind when dealing with hhese departmenm!"nts was; "Yes, Sir; yes, Sir, yes 
36 
Sir and nothing more!" 
Conversely it was the burden of the black person to work for 
the white, to be accountable to the white, to show respect and de-
ference, and to suffer in virtually all instances from unequal com-
pensation for equal work. The structural insecurity of the black 
was the mirror image of the structural security of the white. For 
whereas the drunken white would be brusquely escorted home, the abu-
sive white reprimanded informally, and the poverty-stricken white 
given access to various social welfare, church, and state assistance, 
the black person in similar situations could anticipate a term of 
37 
corrective forced labor or at best repatriation to the home area. 
This lopsided context of social relations is not untypical of 
colonial Africa as a whole. The difference in Mozambique becomes 
evident when one looks at the distribution the population along 
class lines, and at the dominant production processes. There was 
more room for conflict in Mozambique given the potential competition 
between unskilled and semi-skilled blacks and whites for positions. 
White workers lost no time securing their advantage over blacks 
through their access to the dominant forces in the political economy, 
and the metropolitan powers did not have the kinds of ties to local 
capitalist interests that tended to curb working class power in the 
38 
interests of big capital in other areas. The service nature of 
15 
the Louren~o Marques economy and the dominant labor-intensive 
production processes made it more conducive to broad informal 
labor control than was possible in more highly industrialized 
areas. Finally, it is certain that the option to work in South 
Africa acted as a safety valve for African discontent through-
out the century. When mobility, security and prosperity seemed 
hopelessly circumscribed at home, Mozambicans, with some sacrifice, 
could still acquire bridewealth, instruments of production, neces-
sary tax, education and consumer money by working legally or clan-
destinely in South Africa. Escape to the mines was especially marked 
in periods of falling real wages or during recruitment campaigns 
for the Mozambican military forces. 39 
The cyclical influx of unskilled, illiterate and undercapital-
ized Portuguese into Lourengo Marques throughout the century threat-
ened the jobs of local Africans, local Portuguese women, and non-
Portuguese whites who had managed, often at great sacrifice, to 
secure a marginal but attractive job. Unemployment crises period-
ically evolved into local press campaigns intended to drive these 
persons from their jobs in order to replace them with white Portu-
40 guese males. Examples of such campaigns, the established pecking 
order of these different groups, and the attitudes toward them 
can be drawn from crisis periods throughout the century. Each cam-
paign highlights current attitudes toward the vulnerable groups. 
The most common, most virulent and ironically least successful 
campaigns were waged by the Portuguese petty bourgeoisie against 
British Indian artisans, merchants, proprietors, skilled and 
16 
semi-skilled laborers. While obviously rooted in economic com-
petition, and often resolved by legislating economic advantages for 
white Portuguese (through licensing, employment quotas and the like), 
these campaigns were articulated in terms of Asian corruption of 
the unwary African, through fraud, miscegenation, and in general 
setting a bad example. The key word was sloth. The irony derives 
from the fact that it was precisely Asian ingenuity, resourceful-
ness, and thrift, and their willingness to learn African languages, 
and to interact with Africans on the most humble terms that made 
them such economically productive citizens in terms of the ser-
vices and networks they provided and thus provided them with a 
relative invulnerability to such campaigns. 
Asians similarly competed successfully with Africans for jobs 
and entrepreneurial opportunities, and thus the potential for 
bitterness between these two groups was no less real. From the mid-
nineteenth century Asians had progressively taken over trade, trans-
port facilities and markets which had formerly been in African 
42 hands. They did not, however, move into these positions through 
control of the political economy, but rather through their superior 
access to and resourceful use of capital. 
The conflict between Africans and British Asians was diminished 
once again precisely because of the Asians' economic utility It 
was the Asian merchants who catered to the African consumer market, 
outside of wine. Asians communicated in the Africa, idiom, and 
if an African man or woman wanted to apprentice in any area from 
mechanics to dressmaking the best and often the only opportunity 
17 
was with an Asian artisan. Once again the Asians• distance from 
those who controlled the political economy made them less threat-
ening to Africans. An Asian who made a practice of cheating his 
African laborers or customers did not enjoy the kind of innnunity 
at the police station enjoyed by white Portuguese. 43 
Goanese who were prominent in the lower ranks of the state 
bureaucracy were seen by Africans as their innnediate rivals for 
upward m0bility in the keenly sought civil service sector, Fur-
thermore it was often the Goanese petty functionary with whom Afr-
cans had to conduct their bothersome paperwork, and from whom they 
had to receive their petty reprimands, Goans, however, enjoyed 
the privilege of Portuguese nationality and the advantages that 
brought with it. He was therefore seen as enjoying the good life 
at African expense and was often seen as the innnediate oppressor 
44 
as well. 
Going down the pecking order one finds occasional assimilado 
campaigns to get European women out of civil service and retail 
sales positions for which assimilados could compete. The campaigns 
often coincided with periods of falling real wages or rising un-
employment. In periods of serious unemployment,European males 
joined in the hue and cry to force women back to their proper 
places, mending socks, In the 1960 1s the campaign charged that 
these European women did not need the wages to help support their 
families, but simply wanted cash to purchase household gadgets. 
Leisure time and economic independence, particularly among married 
women, were seen as a potential threat to masculinity and the 
family honor. 45 
18 
The pressure from the Portuguese working class to exclude 
blacks from the competition for certain jobs and from receiving 
certain benefits was exacerbated at times by pressure to define 
more attractive jobs as the preserve of whites -- in times of 
crises even the position of latrine guard was seen as attractive. 
Assimilados were always vulnerable to white tolerance, due in part 
to their own aspirations for equal treatment, and their historical 
role as a comprador group. Thus, they often found themselves 
the first to be sacrificed to white ambition. 46 They were harrassed 
and humilated by whites and tolerated, distrusted or despised by 
other blacks. They were called "pocket whites" or "paper whites;" 
black men who, due to the legal papers carried in their pockets, 
were encouraged to identify with whites, as distinct from "natives," 
but only when it suited white needs. They enjoyed token material 
benefits as favored sons, but the fragility of their position be-
came increasingly obvious as the century progressed and the white 
population grew. 
From the writings of the first Africans to receive the so-
called alvara de assimila~ao (assimilation certificate) in 1917 
to interviews with contemporary Mozambicans who filed for assimi-
lation certificates in the late 1950's, it is clear that the as-
similation certificate was sought, often grudgingly, in order to 
facilitate upward mobility, minimize harrassment, and hopefully 
to open opportunities for one's children. The obvious inequality 
of having to verify one's equality with a document to be carried 
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on one's person and presented upon demand was a sore point from 
the start, but the legal @nd economic privileges carried by the 
status were sufficient to convince some seven hundred Mozambicans 
in the years up to 1954 to take out assimilation papers in the 
47 Louren~o Marques courts. 
Given the token advantages enjoyed by the assimilado, the cam-
paign of 1948-1949, which is particularly well-documented, poignantly 
illustrates the pettiness of the process. The Central Office of 
Native Affairs undertook a systematic investigation into the life-
styles of certain assimilados to determine whether or not they 
conformed with the recently tightened legal standards for assimi-
1 . 48 at1.on. The purpose was to weed out unqualified assimilados, who, 
lacking the material accoutrements of prosperity supposedly inte-
gral to maintaining the standards and prestige of white Portuguese, 
would no longer receive preferential wages or privilege. Those 
assimilados judged by the local native affairs officer to be living 
below these standards (despite the fact that assimilados were sup-
posedly no longer under the jurisdiction of native affairs officers) 
had their wages reduced to those appropriate for native labor and 
in some cases lost their jobs. 
Comments penned on the documentation by investigative officials 
expose the true intentions and attitudes behind such press cam-
paigns and support charges of Portuguese petty jealousy. Comments, 
for example, such as, "How many Europeans aspire to a position such 
as this black man has, but are unable to find one? Room and board 
49 plus 1,500$00 escudos a month," The fact that many Portuguese 
lived in Louren~o Marques without the supposedly necessary I 
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accoutrements for the prestige of the white race, yet received 
the disproportionately high white wage further fueled the already 
well-established Mozambican attitude that "It is not by one's 
merit that one's value is appraised: it is by color •••• If you 
want a job today you have to be white ••.. If you are colored 
live on a crumb of bread -- the land is for the whites."SO 
Manuel Joaodos Santos Tembe, who took out assimilation papers in 
1960, explained why, despite the hypocrisy of it all he did so: 
I always carried the documents of a 
native, because I am a native. I am a 
Negro afterall, aren't I? But after a 
long time I also became an assimilado, 
and like the majority of natives here what 
convinced me was the possibility of earning 
a bit more money -- it was for this reason 
alone .••. Those who were not assimilados 
were Negroes afterall, ang 1as such they 
always earned a pittance. 
Tembe went on to explain that without a raise he would be hard 
pressed to afford school fees for his growing family. Since he 
was a quiet and reserved man, he had no cunha, no padrinho or white 
godfather/patron in the bureaucracy to help him along, and his only 
recourse was assimilation. 52 
The majority of informants were poor and uneducated -- never 
in the position even to consider assimilation, but they were of 
two minds about assimilados. There was often sympathy for those 
who were in the position to assimilate in order to make a little 
headway in the system, to be more mobile in the city, and to protect 
themselves and their families from the humiliation of arbitrary 
arrest and forced labor. The consensus among all classes, however, 
was that the assimilado who used his privilege to lord it over 
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his black brothers was a particularly despicable individual, Re 
was ludicrous not only because he was assuming the prerogative 
of the white man, but that despite the documents in his pocket, 
it was patently obvious to all that his skin was black. The most 
typical comment with regard to the myth of assimilado equality with 
whites was, "Everyone could see his skin was black. Re was black, 
the same color as me. We all knew it even if he didn't." 53 
Those who aspired socially to go beyond the color of their own 
skin were seen as fools -- dangerous fools, arrogant fools, or 
prosperous fools, but fools nonetheless. 
If Africans were of two minds about their fellow Africans who 
aspired to white privilege, they were more certain about their 
feelings toward white privilege for whites. The kubvana, the 
mumaji, the bureaucrat, the self-made entrepreneur, the top ad-
ministrators and missionaries -- Africans saw all of them as en-
joying unfair advantages at their own expense. Attitudes toward 
more powerful Portuguese were often colored for purposes of patron-
age or political lobbying and therefore softened. The Centro 
Associative dos Negroes de Mofambique, for example, hosted a gala 
bon voyage banquet for Portuguese entrepreneur Paulino Santos 
Gil when he planned to retire to Lisbon. The well-known fact 
that Santos Gil had managed to accumulate sufficient capital to 
build a diverse and impressive network of businesses in Louren~o 
Marques by chronically overworking his forced labor contractees 
under appalling conditions on his public works contracts,and wood 
working business in particular, was over-looked, and Santos Gil 
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was festively toasted for generously providing so many jobs for 
local Africans and for his donation of 20,000$00 escudos toward 
the construction of the Association's national headquarters. 54 
Such flattery was not uncommonly employed with powerful and 
dangerous individuals for strategic purposes. It might have been 
this type of attitude displayed toward the clearly threatening 
Jos6 Paiva Raposo, mentioned earlier, which prompted his European 
colleague to record for posterity that the Africans "adored him." 55 
Clearly the Portuguese in general were not respected by the 
majority of the African population. African attitudes toward the 
Portuguese in the press, in their songs and in their interview 
testimony reflect their conviction that the Portuguese were petty, 
niggardly, jealous, inept and often tyrannical at the workplace 
and the business place. Again, the strong British-South African 
presence in the city and the area provided an obvious foil to the 
Portuguese. The two were often compared as employers and admin-
istrators. 
In 1909, Jo'ao Albasini explained, with his typical insight, 
that the veterinarians and emigration personnel were British 
(Witwatersrand gold mines recruitment officials) while the Por-
tuguese simply castigated der:elicts and collected taxes; the 
Portuguese promised great things, but were unable to follow through. 
What few good jobs or material benefits (piped water, paved streets, 
schools) derived from Portuguese initiatives accrued primarily to 
Portuguese whites. Furthermore the British were seen to hire 
their labor and the Portuguese to conscript theirs. 56 
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The common charge was that the Portuguese lived off the 
blacks. The majority of Portuguese were petty traders, 
bureaucrats, or some combination of the two. The Portuguese 
traders sold imported "nigger wine" or locally distilled "nigger 
rum" to tap magaica (Mozambican miners) wages. The bureaucrats 
profited from renting out the state's forced laborers to their 
friends to run their Sunday errands. All whites ultimately bene-
fited from the privileges and comforts of a system built directly 
and indirectly on the sweat of the African brow, while Africans 
could expect little if anything in return for their taxes and 
labor. 57 
In summary, the Portuguese were seen at best as irrelevant 
to the wellbeing of the African community. Albasini's comment 
that the British were perceived as the real power behind things 
and the Portuguese as their somewhat pathetic whipping boys 
was followed by ridicule of Portuguese efforts to imitate the 
powerful British with tennis, whisky and soda. If the Portuguese 
seriously wished to emulate the English, Albasini quipped, they 
should begin by noting that the British do not beat their workers. 58 
The very agencies established in part to fulfill Portugal's 
so-called civilizing mission were similarly compromised in African 
eyes. Health and educational programs chronically fell short 
of their glorious announcements, and once established they were 
often monopolized by poor whites, or whites were seen to receive 
a disproportionate share of the benefit. 59 The programs were 
further compromised by the inability of Portuguese personnel to 
function in the African tongue. In one instance I had been puzzled 
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by complaints from Portuguese officials in documents that despite 
the limited but free facilities set up for Africans at the central 
hospital, they had to virtually kidnap Africans to get them to 
use the facilities, while city Africans lined up daily to pay 
for health care at the Swiss Mission hospital outside of town. 
Informants were amused when asked to clarify the problem. The simple 
fact was that no one at the Portuguese hospital understood a word 
they said, so it was impossible to find out what was wrong with 
them or their children, whereas everyone at the mission hospital 
from nurse to midwife to surgeon was fluent in the local African 
60 languages. 
Lack of professional training was a problem throughout the 
colonial period. Many P<ortuguese missionaries and health personnel 
were ignorant of African languages. The same was not true of the 
two most prominent foreign missions or of the ubiquitous Witwaters-
rand Native Labor Association personnel. The fact that the Por-
tuguese missionaries who were charged with the education of the 
African population were most often unable to speak an African 
language was a very serious drawback. 61 The Portuguese defense 
for such a striking practical inadequacy -- that the idea was to 
teach Portuguese and not to promulgate the use of what they consid-
ered to be backward languages -- was blatantly shallow. Africans 
bridled at being reprimanded in the schools and the workplace for 
speaking "the language of dogs." They were quick to point out 
that the powerful South African mining capitalists saw nothing 
demeaning about conversing with their employees in fanakalo, or lolo 
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as the conglomerate lingua-franca of the mining industry was called 
in Louren~o !1arques. 62 
As the principal educator of the African population/the 
Catholic church was further compromised since it was seen as a hand 
of the state. Its own compromises with respect to the Christian 
principles of equality and humanity, however, were responsible for 
the disgrace of the church in African eyes. The periodic segrega-
tion of churches and church schools always brought a crashing out-
cry from the assimilado editors of O Africano and O Brado Africano 
who had historically looked to the Catholic church to secure bene-
fits for Africans and had defended the Catholic church from the 
criticism of Africans sympathetic to the local foreign missions. 63 
The greatest bitterness toward the Portuguese uncovered in 
seven months of interviewing was directed toward the Catholic church 
and resulted largely from the construction of its S~ cathedral in 
central downtown Louren~o Marques. The cathedral was the second 
to the last major public building in Lourenfo Marques to be con-
structed with prison labor and forced contract labor. The threat 
of international scandal after the second world war made such 
practices politically unacceptable in the public view. The workers, 
men and women, working with their legs sometimes shackled, under 
the view of armed guards, carried on with few safety or sanitation 
precautions. Women .. imprisoned for brewing or for the sale of 
beverages derived from local produce, hauled mud, concrete and fire-
wood to the construction area and prepared the meals for their fellow 
prisoners. Several workers were killed when their leg chains 
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became entangled in the upper scaffolding; they fell and were 
hung up on the lower scaffolding, Some informants insisted that 
the dead were allowed to hang in that position until the end of the 
work day. Most informants pointed immediately to the cathedral 
when asked about prison labor in the city. Several concurred with 
the comment of Comrade E. Muianga that, "The cathedral was built 
for the devil himself! The prison, not the church built that 
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cathedral!" 
Were there Portuguese whom the Africans revered? Certainly 
thousands of Portuguese enjoyed warm relationships with Mozambicans 
and vice versa. While mutual trust and respect did not at all typ-
ify the system, they did occur. The entire structure, however, 
lobbied successfully against balanced reciprocity and mutual respect. 
The pervasive patronage system imported as a central part of 
Portuguese culture in combination with the progressive institu-
tionalization of racialist political relations and capitalist rela-
tions of production presented a formidable counterbalance to genuine 
individual initiatives. The patronage system contributed to the 
appearance of positive interracial relations by providing material 
incentives for Africans to cultivate the personal good will of 
certain whites. Often these relationships of godparentage went 
beyond the more crass necessities of having someone to depend upon 
to help one with a promotion, get one off the hook, or contribute 
hand-me-down shirts to one's wardrobe, but the basic motivation 
behind such ritualized contacts was clear to both parties, 65 
The patronage godfather system was adopted virtually intact 
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by the Afro-Portuguese and assimilado clique which published the 
Af . 66 two rican papers. It was also adopted for some social relations 
and relations of production in the workplace. Thus informants who 
were able to secure a relatively stable job through the interces-
sion of an older compatriot on the job, or through any combination 
of kinship connections frequently explained that so-and-so had 
acted as a padrinho (godfather) for him. The majority of Africans 
who occupied the least skilled, least remunerative positions func-
tioned at a distance from the white population and were personally 
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unfamiliar with this type of patronage. 
The paper has primarily addressed the period up to 1962 since 
the author's oral and archival research was specifically concerned 
with that period, but interview material covered the period to 
independence and that, in combination with secondary source material, 
makes it convenient to draw the following generalizations for 
the final period. 
Two phenomena significantly altered the Mozambican colonial 
context and therefore African attitudes toward the Portuguese--
the vast increase in capitalist investment from 1957 to 1973-1974 
and the armed struggle for independence initiated in 1964. The 
role of metropolitan and international capital in the development 
68 plans during this period has been explored elsewhere. What 
concerns us here is that the increased expenditure from whatever 
sources tended to temporarily improve the wages, conditions and 
occupational mobility available to qualified Africans. A parallel 
expansion of improved health, educational, credit and technical 
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services to the African population further raised hopes that the 
younger generation of Mozambicans might enjoy a brighter future 
than had their parents. 
These technical and material gains were severely compromised 
by the increased tension of the armed struggle and the formation 
of an awesome police state pattern of interrogation, incarceration, 
torture and terror. A common strategy given the carrot of brighter 
horizons and the stick of absolute political submission was to with-
draw to the privacy and safety of one's immediate family, avoid 
all situations and intercourse which could possibly be construed 
to be suspicious -- in short to keep one's nose clean. 69 The only 
realistic alternative was seen to be clandestine departure to join 
the luta, and this risked horrid recriminations against one's 
family. Thus as the attitude of fear developed, due to increased 
persecution and torture, into an attitude of hate, all hope for 
compromise disappeared. 
The optimism of the early 1960's was further whittled away 
by the common process of local forces which acted to maintain the 
status quo in order to reestablish the controls supposedly abolished 
by the 1961-1962 paper reforms (in the form of a code for rural 
labor). The familiar influx of unskilled immigrants contributed to 
the further erosion of early gains and disillusionment was nearly 
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complete. 
By 1977 most informants felt that it was just as well that 
the Portuguese chose, for the most part, to abandon Mozambique 
rather than to live under the FRELIMO government of the People's 
Republic of Mozambique. They suggested that most of those who 
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stayed did so because they had little alternative. Most informants 
felt that, given the weight of past experience, few Portuguese would 
ever truly feel comfortable or compatible with blacks. But, most 
important, now that Mozambique was their country and they could 
live and walk in the streets of the capital as full-fleged Mozam-
bican citizens, they didn't really think very much about the Por-
tuguese one way or the other. 
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Notes 
Much of this paper is based directly or indirectly on some 150 individ-
ual and group interviews conducted with elderly Mozambicans between Feb-
ruary and November 1977. Two major interview programs were undertaken, one 
at the port complex and another within the city hall complex. The city 
hall program was the larger program and involved the full time assistance 
~ of Comrade Gaspar Salamao Guevende, a Grupo Dinimizador at city hall. 
The remaining interviews were independently undertaken with informants 
contacted through neighborhood or kinship networks generated in part from 
the formal programs and in part from the author's daily contacts among 
neighbors and friends. The author wishes to express her sincere thanks 
to all those who made oral history an immensely satisfying experience. 
Complete transcripts of all interview material have been deposited at the 
Centro de Estudos Africanos, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, Mozam-
bique. 
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